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DLD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2403 
___________ 
 
EUGENE E. CHATMAN, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH; 
OFFICER HIROS; OFFICER FREEMAN; 
LEGACY APARTMENTS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-0638) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 8, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 15, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Eugene Chatman appeals the District Court‟s order dismissing his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
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and exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily vacate 
the District Court‟s order and remand for further proceedings.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
On May 13, 2011, Chatman filed a handwritten pro se complaint along with a 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  Although the complaint is exceedingly terse, it 
focuses on three events that may or may not be related:  (1) a rent dispute with his 
landlord, Legacy Apartments; (2) an incident where the police handcuffed him and 
brought him to the county jail; and (3) an incident where the police handcuffed him and 
escorted him to his apartment.  Chatman has not identified either the defendants that he 
seeks to sue or the causes of action that he seeks to raise. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e).  The 
Court did not provide Chatman with an opportunity to amend because it concluded that 
Chatman‟s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See D.C. Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923).  Chatman then filed this appeal. 
We agree with the District Court that, as drafted, the complaint fails to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.  To avoid dismissal, a complaint‟s “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  The complaint “must not be „so 
undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is 
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contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8].‟”  Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 
59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2008)).  Here, as the District Court held, Chatman‟s complaint fails to satisfy these 
standards.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that a 
complaint may be dismissed if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Nevertheless, prior to dismissing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e), a district 
court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defect 
unless such an amendment would be futile or prejudicial.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  The District Court concluded that any 
amendment would be futile because Chatman‟s claims would inevitably be barred by the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  While we agree that that doctrine may be applicable insofar as 
Chatman seeks damages for harm allegedly caused by an adverse state-court judgment, it 
appears that he may also be seeking to present claims that are beyond the doctrine‟s 
scope.  See generally Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the contours of the doctrine and stressing that Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), rejected an 
“expansive application”).  Thus, while we express no view as to whether Chatman will 
ultimately plead a meritorious claim, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
dismissing the complaint without providing leave to amend. 
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We will thus summarily vacate the District Court‟s order dismissing the case and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
